Collaboration and opportunism in megaproject alliance contracts: The interplay between governance, trust and culture by Galvin, Peter et al.
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
ECU Publications Post 2013 
2021 
Collaboration and opportunism in megaproject alliance contracts: 




Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons 
10.1016/j.ijproman.2021.02.007 
Galvin, P., Tywoniak, S., & Sutherland, J. (2021). Collaboration and opportunism in megaproject alliance contracts: 
The interplay between governance, trust and culture. International Journal of Project Management, 39(4), 394-405. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2021.02.007 
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online. 
International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 394–405 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
International Journal of Project Management 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman 
Collaboration and opportunism in megaproject alliance contracts: The 
interplay between governance, trust and culture 
Peter Galvin a , ∗ , Stephane Tywoniak b , Janet Sutherland a 
a School of Business & Law, Edith Cowan University, Australia 
b Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, Canada 








a b s t r a c t 
Alliance contracts have been introduced in megaprojects to improve the alignment of objectives, risk and reward 
between client and contractor. However, the relational norms of alliances are not sufficient on their own to elim- 
inate opportunistic behaviors. This study shows that, investing in mechanisms supportive of governance, culture, 
and trust provides a platform upon which firms may foster collaboration and limit self-interest oriented behavior 
amongst alliance partners. Our qualitative case study of a major project-based organization reveals the impact of 
these mechanisms, and more pointedly, how they interact and often reinforce each other. Governance, culture 
and trust are interlinked and complementary, and managers need to reflect holistically on their interactions in 
order to establish collaborative, rather than opportunistic behaviors. 
1. Introduction 
Opportunistic behavior occurs when firms pursue actions in their 
own self-interest to maximize their financial return at the expense of 
vulnerable parties ( Williamson, 1985 ). Such behavior may take vari- 
ous forms including failing to fulfil obligations, withholding relevant 
information, or not bargaining/negotiating in good faith (often relying 
upon information asymmetries). Research concerning transaction cost 
economics has highlighted that opportunistic behavior is most preva- 
lent under conditions of high uncertainty, high levels of complexity and 
where there are significant asset-specific investments that cannot be ap- 
plied to other contracts without loss ( Moschandreas, 1997 ). 
These three conditions are frequently observed in megaprojects –
projects which are notable for their enormous scale, long time-frames 
and non-repetitive nature ( Brookes Sage, Dainty, Locatelli, & Whyte, 
2017 ). High levels of uncertainty and complexity often arise due to 
the scale and timeframes involved, making it impossible to develop 
all-encompassing contracts ex-ante, whilst the unique nature of such 
projects increases the likelihood of investments being required in spe- 
cific assets thereby creating the potential for holdup by one party and 
the inability to effectively retaliate against an opportunistic partner 
( Gil, 2009 ). As such, opportunistic behavior is a recognized problem for 
megaprojects and a range of examples of opportunistic behavior per- 
vade the literature whereby one party exploits unexpected events for 
their benefit ( Gil, Pinto, & Smyth, 2011 ). 
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To counter this problem, in recent years, megaproject sponsors have 
gradually moved away from traditional, adversarial forms of contract- 
ing and focused more on collaborative approaches that encourage mu- 
tual cooperation ( Hein Tywoniak, & Evans, 2017 ; Brady & Davies, 2014 ; 
Davis & Love, 2011 ). The result has been an increasing reliance on vari- 
ous forms of non-traditional contracts to deliver megaprojects, including 
alliances, relational contracts, or public-private partnerships ( Clifton & 
Duffield, 2006 ; Bygballe Jahre, & Swärd, 2010 ; Lahdenperä, 2012 ) – as 
these contractual forms enable participants in the contract to ‘share the 
gain and share the pain’ ( Lloyd-Walker Mills, & Walker, 2014 ). 
However, these more relational contracts that emphasize coopera- 
tive behavior, mutual dependence and reciprocity between parties do 
not in themselves reduce the potential for opportunistic behavior unless 
firms can design contracts along with operational systems and struc- 
tures that incentivize desired collaborative behaviors over opportunis- 
tic behaviors. As such, coupled with the growth of interest in relational 
style contracts is a corresponding interest in determining the conditions 
and incentives that encourage independent firms to act in a collabora- 
tive and trustworthy manner throughout the contract. This work has 
emerged from a variety of perspectives and notably includes research 
within transaction cost economics, sociology and supply chain manage- 
ment ( Gil, 2009 ). 
The most common response to address the issue of opportunism 
across a range of literature bases is the concept of trust. Whilst trust may 
be treated as an antonym for opportunism from a sociological perspec- 
tive, Williamson (1993) suggests that trust is perhaps better understood 
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in calculative terms whereby the gain from a particular action is in fact 
outweighed by risk involved. Nevertheless, trust is a common theme 
pertaining to effective relational contracts (e.g. Lau & Rowlinson, 2009 ; 
Kadefors, 2004 ; Pinto Slevin, & English, 2009 ). Other considerations 
that pertain to limiting opportunistic behavior within contracts that also 
have a sociological underpinning include commitment, power and orga- 
nizational culture ( Clegg Pitsis, Rura-Polley, & Marosszeky, 2002 ; Lloyd- 
Walker et al., 2014 ; Xue Yuan, & Shi, 2016 ). Outside of the sociological 
perspective that looks at how opportunism may be limited through the 
manner in which relationships are managed, there are a series of factors 
that focus upon the manner in which the contract is managed. These 
considerations tend to fall within a broad cluster of governance issues 
and highlight the potential to reduce opportunism through the design 
of the contract, decision making structures and organizational design 
including factors such as co-location (e.g. Biesenthal & Wilden, 2014 ; 
Brunet & Aubry, 2016 ; Henisz Levitt, & Scott, 2012 ). 
Whilst megaproject specific research is just one limb of this increas- 
ing focus upon relational contracts, it does present all parties with some 
unique challenges which may not be present in smaller scale projects. 
The number of parties involved and the constantly changing make-up 
of teams over a period of years as the projects move through differ- 
ent stages towards completion create additional complexities to con- 
sider. Perhaps more importantly however, the considerations to limit 
opportunistic behavior that have been addressed to date have tended 
to focus upon just one or two of the conditions and incentives in any 
particular study that may limit opportunistic behavior at a time. Work 
such as that by Gil (2009) or Davis and Love (2011) tend to consider 
these conditions and incentives in isolation, rather than how they may 
work together including their interactive effect. To address these poten- 
tial limitations, we seek to identify those conditions and mechanisms 
within the megaprojects undertaken in one infrastructure-based pub- 
lic sector agency to address, not just which conditions and mechanisms 
were deemed critical to limiting opportunistic behavior, but also the 
way that they interact, both positively and negatively, with each other 
over time. 
We begin with a review of the literature on opportunism and 
megaprojects, before addressing past research about those conditions 
and mechanisms which may assist contractual partners to behave col- 
laboratively rather than in an opportunistic manner. This is followed by 
a discussion of our research strategy and the presentation of our qualita- 
tive case study on alliance contracting at Main Roads Western Australia. 
We conclude the paper with a discussion of our findings and the impli- 
cations for managing alliance contracts in respect of megaprojects along 
with future research opportunities. 
2. Megaprojects and opportunism 
Megaprojects are traditionally designated as those involving large 
investments over long time frames and invariably bring with them high 
levels of risk and complexity ( Brookes et al., 2017 ; Flyvbjerg Bruzelius, 
& Rothengatter, 2003 ; Flyvbjerg, 2014 ). They are most commonly asso- 
ciated with major infrastructure projects such as transport, telecommu- 
nications and energy generation projects; developing facilities for sport- 
ing events such as the Olympics; and major defence projects. Defined 
as “temporary endeavors (i.e. projects) characterized by large invest- 
ment commitment, vast complexity (especially in organizational terms), 
and long-lasting impact on the economy, the environment, and society ”
( Brookes & Locatelli, 2015 : p.58) they are often designated as those in- 
volving investments of $1 billion or more. However, it is the high levels 
of complexity, significant innovation, extended length of time and im- 
pact upon the economy, the environment or society that sets megapro- 
jects apart rather than the cost dimension per se or even the one-off or 
temporary nature ( Scott, Levitt, & Orr, 2011 ). 
Given the scale and scope of challenges associated with megapro- 
jects it is not unsurprising that they are very often “late, over 
budget and fail to meet their original objectives ” ( Davies & 
Mackenzie, 2014 : p.773). Research on project costs overruns (e.g. 
Flyvbjerg, 2014 ; Love Irani, Smith, Regan, & Liu, 2017 ; Rosenfeld, 2014 ; 
Sanderson, 2012 ) has uncovered a range of causal factors “from a poor 
understanding of the impact of systemicity and complexity projects, un- 
realistic cost targets and misguided trade-offs between project scope, 
time and cost to suspicions of foul play and even corruption ” ( Ahiaga- 
Dagbui Smith, Love, & Ackermann, 2015 : p.1). Flyvbjerg (2014) has 
suggested that nine out of ten megaprojects are over budget, highlight- 
ing the challenges involved in managing megaprojects including the re- 
lationship between the contracting parties. 
While traditional contracting approaches tend to rely upon detailed 
specifications and fixed-prices as a way to control for risk on the part 
of the contracting organization ( Williams, 1996 ), such approaches tend 
to be ill-suited for megaprojects ( Gil, 2009 ). In such contracts, the man- 
agement (and pricing) of risk occurs via “a rational, linear process of 
identification, analysis, evaluation and treatment within a defined or- 
ganizational context ” ( Tywoniak & Bredillet, 2017 ). However, this risk 
assessment and management process can only be effectively employed 
against known risks where some level of probability can be assessed 
( Dequech, 2011 ) and in the case of ‘unknown unknowns’, traditional, 
reductionist approaches are likely to be unsuitable, difficult to quan- 
tify and incorporate into contracting process, and thus may sit at the 
heart of poor performance ( de Bakker, Boonstra, & Wortmann, 2010 ; 
Loch, DeMaeyer, & Pich, 2011 ). 
By their very nature, megaprojects are likely to take years (or even 
decades) to complete, thus frequently requiring changes in scope during 
the project; they are generally one-off in nature often requiring inno- 
vation to deal with engineering challenges or other unique aspects of 
the project (making them difficult to cost); and changes in the macro- 
environment, including technology can make the best planning some- 
what redundant ( Brookes et al., 2017 ). Thus, traditional contracting 
models, whereby clients seek to determine all of the uncertainties at 
the beginning of the project, lock down the design and then use (a se- 
ries of) fixed price contracts that push much of the risk onto the con- 
tractor(s), are unlikely to lead to successful outcomes that are on-time 
and on-budget ( Gil, 2009 ). Quite simply, the ‘unknown unknowns’ cre- 
ate too many opportunities for disputes over unanticipated aspects of 
the projects. Contracting for megaprojects requires incomplete contracts 
( Williamson, 1985 ), which in turn exposes parties to “self interest seek- 
ing with guile ” ( Williamson, 1993 : p.97), ie: opportunism. 
Considering contracting for these megaprojects via the lens of new 
institutional economics ( Williamson, 2000 ) is pertinent as opportunism 
(alongside bounded rationality) is seen as a core issue: “But for op- 
portunism, most forms of complex contracting and hierarchy vanish ”
( Williamson, 1993 : p.97). Contractual incompleteness may foster poor 
performance as it exposes the potentially divergent objectives of the 
contracting party (the principal) and the contractors (agents) who un- 
dertake the work ( Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ; Winch, 2014 ). Principals 
essentially seek to maximize quality for a specific price and shift the 
risks associated with the project onto the contractor as much as is fea- 
sibly possible, while the agent seeks to ensure an appropriate financial 
return. As such, some decisions by agents concerning specific aspects of 
projects may be in the agent’s best interests rather than necessarily in 
the best interests of the principal ( Denis, Danis, & Sarin, 1997 ). 
With principals seeking to shift risk onto agents, and agents look- 
ing to achieve a reasonable rate of return on their activities, it can be 
difficult to design incentive measures that align the objectives of prin- 
cipals and agents ( Rose & Manley, 2010 ). The result is often oppor- 
tunistic behavior. To reduce such behavior, principals invest in nego- 
tiating, specifying and drafting detailed contracts that covers all likely 
eventualities (creating significant ex-ante transaction costs). In addition, 
they then monitor and where necessary enforce the contract, thereby 
increasing ex-post transaction costs. Even in such scenarios, it is vir- 
tually impossible to account for every eventuality as contracts are in- 
evitably incomplete and thus the potential for opportunism cannot be 
eliminated ( Williamson, 1985 ). Given the relatively poor record of suc- 
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cess of outcome-based contracts in respect of megaprojects and the obvi- 
ous alignment challenges that exist in respect of principals and agents, 
contracting parties around the world have looked at different options 
concerning contracting for megaprojects that are more flexible and able 
to address these issues. 
2.1. Alliance contracts and opportunism 
Alliance contracting is one contract type that has been adopted 
with some level of frequency for some larger public sector contracts 
( Sanderson, Allen, Gill, & Garnett, 2018 ) and is becoming increasingly 
popular in the Australian construction industry ( Rowlinson, Cheung, Si- 
mons, & Rafferty, 2006 ; Galvin & Tywoniak, 2019 ). The relational di- 
mension provides the potential to reduce the likelihood of opportunism, 
but it still allows the project to benefit from the use of external parties 
that often bring with them specialist knowledge and capabilities. Such a 
model incentivizes behaviors by aligning the objectives of the principal 
and agent on the basis of sharing both the risks and the rewards between 
all alliance partners ( Arthur & Kennedy, 2014 ). 
Relying upon a level of collective ownership amongst the partners, 
alliance contracts emphasize “coproduction, facilitated by governance 
structures and relationship building activities to encourage collective 
responsibility ( Sanderson et al., 2018 : p.1064). In cases concerning 
megaprojects, the inability to lock down specific outcomes ‘up-front’ 
that may then be assessed over the course of the contract supports a 
shift to rely more upon relational norms in the form of alliance con- 
tracts. Organizations pursuing these ‘relationship based contractual ar- 
rangements’ then work in a collaborative manner to share the risks and 
the benefits ( Love et al., 2010 ; Davies, 2008 ). 
However, this reliance upon relational norms as the basis for man- 
aging unexpected occurrences and the distribution of work is subject 
to a variety of risks – not least being the potential for opportunistic 
behavior on the part of the partners. Human behavior, being as it is, 
allows for organizations to behave in a somewhat opportunistic fash- 
ion relative to their partners if there is a belief that they can undertake 
certain actions that will be beneficial to themselves, even if somewhat 
detrimental to the partnership as a whole ( Williamson, 1993 ). The shift 
away from acting in mutual interest to self interest that can occur in 
alliance contracts may align somewhat with the ‘prisoners dilemma’ 
scenario. Here, the optimal solution for both parties is always to col- 
laborate, however, a single player may act opportunistically if there 
is a belief that the benefits that will accrue (after accounting for the 
downsides of disrupting the relationship) will exceed the benefits of col- 
laboration ( Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2019 ) – though multiple iterations of 
the ‘game’ does lessen the frequency of players acting opportunistically 
( Axelrod, 1980 ; Rendell et al., 2010 ). The tendency for firms to shift 
their behavior towards self interest and act opportunistically has seen 
different authors identifying a variety of factors that are important in 
driving the success of the alliance contract – governance systems, trust, 
commitment, interdependence, values and cultural fit ( Davies Dodg- 
son, Gann, & MacAulay, 2017 ; Gil, 2009 ). Prior research that addresses 
different conditions and mechanisms that encourage firms in contracts 
to behave collaboratively rather than opportunistically are introduced 
below. 
2.2. Conditions and mechanisms that reduce opportunistic behavior 
In theory, the pre-alliance negotiations should put in place a series of 
systems and structures that will ensure that the partners are able to man- 
age unforeseen events through a collaborative approach ( Bygballe et al., 
2010 ). Who does what, and how different activities are costed/paid 
will have been predetermined, but just as importantly, the governance 
structures will include coverage of factors such as how disputes are re- 
solved (such as via the use of independent parties), the extent to which 
the alliance is driven by one specific party versus a ‘hybrid team’ that 
operates more as a third party, such as those used in joint ventures 
( Wilson, 1995 ). The governance systems will also outline the proce- 
dures, decision making approaches and performance measuring systems 
( Too & Weaver, 2014 ). The extent to which governance processes are 
used to limit opportunism on the part of partners will potentially vary 
over the course of a megaproject and across different megaprojects de- 
pending upon factors such as past experience working together and the 
level of interdependence between the partners. Extensive governance 
systems can provide a degree of confidence in situations featuring high 
uncertainty and can assist in building a sense of interdependence, es- 
pecially where they feature collaborative approaches to problem reso- 
lution. Finally, the influence of the governance structures of the parent 
organizations of the alliance must be noted ( Biesenthal & Wilden, 2014 ; 
Brunet, 2019 ) as different governance logics may be at play and influ- 
ence trade-off calculations between cooperation and opportunism: for 
example, it may be advantageous for the contractor (or client) to align 
the format and timing of reporting and payments to that of the parent 
organization, even if this may not align with the best interest of the 
project. 
With alliance contracts relying upon relational norms, irrespective 
of the governance systems in place, sociology derived constructs such 
as trust between partners is critical for the success of such contracts 
( Gil, Pinto, & Smyth, 2011 ). Trust has been defined as “the willingness 
of one party to relate with another in the belief that the other’s actions 
will be beneficial rather than detrimental to the first party, even though 
this cannot be guaranteed ” ( Child & Faulkner, 1998 : p.45). Trust em- 
anates from a variety of sources and may thus take on different forms 
( McAllister, 1995 ). Cognition-based trust relies upon the knowledge we 
have of others and the evidence we have of their trustworthiness. Affect- 
based trust is founded on the emotional bonds that exist between people. 
Both of these types of trust can develop and be reinforced over time re- 
sulting in informal and voluntaristic cooperation based on behavioral 
norms rather than contractual obligations ( Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 
1995 ). 
Calculative trust is the trust that develops from the expectation that 
the other party will fulfill their obligations based on calculating the costs 
and benefits of this versus other courses of action ( Lane, 1998 ). This 
type of trust is particularly relevant to “relationships which are new and 
hence can only proceed on the basis of institutionalized protection (in- 
corporating deterrence) ” ( Child & Faulkner, 1998 : p.48). The relation- 
ships between alliance contract partners may initially be built on calcu- 
lative trust, relying primarily upon contractual obligations and formal 
governance structures. Over time, these may evolve such that the basis 
of trust becomes cognition or affect-based ( Ring & Van de Ven, 1994 ), 
lessening any reliance upon more formalized mechanisms to reduce the 
likelihood of partners behaving in an opportunistic manner. 
Whilst trust recognizes a willingness to engage with other parties in 
the belief that they will act with mutual interest, commitment implies 
a level of determination to strive towards achievement of a goal ( Locke 
et al., 1981 ). Commitment is seen in an organizational choices that re- 
flect mutual interest in terms of what the organization “is prepared to 
give up [in respect of] its own individual goals or intentions in order to 
increase positive outcomes ” for all parties ( Davis & Love, 2011 : p.450). 
Commitment is affected by beliefs (such as past experience) and moti- 
vations (e.g. importance of the contract to one particular party), and is 
reflected in the behavior of the organization (Wiener, 1982). Over time, 
the mutual interest that emerges for commitment will be affected the 
actions on the part of other parties such that an organization may be- 
come more or less committed in the same way that trust may similarly 
alter according to the actions of other parties in the contract such as 
whether they act in mutual interest or in self-interest (i.e. they behave 
opportunistically). 
Increasingly, alliance-based megaprojects are being delivered 
through integrated project teams ( Fleming & Koppeleman, 1996 ): the 
success of such project alliances is dependent on all participants actively 
aligning their interests, values and behavioral norms ( Aapaoja Her- 
rala, Pekuri, & Haapasalo, 2013 ). In this context, cultural fit provides 
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a basis for effective communication and prioritization of activities. Cul- 
ture is a broad concept and may be observed across various aspects of 
organizational operations– the rituals and routines, the stories, sym- 
bols, power structures, control systems and organizational structures 
( Johnson, 1988 ). As culture affects what is prioritized and what is val- 
ued, it tends to directly impact what is actually done. For example, an 
organization may value short-term financial performance whereas an- 
other may value learning opportunities that improve long-term compet- 
itiveness. 
The degree of cultural fit can thus be critical in determining the ex- 
tent to which the partners are able to work together efficiently. Com- 
monality in respect of behaviors, values and norms across organizations 
provides a degree of similarity that supports affect-based trust given the 
perception of similarity between individuals across the partner orga- 
nizations and the potential for social bonds to develop. Without some 
level of cultural fit, working together is simply far more challenging as 
the divergent stories, myths, language, shared rituals and structures of 
the organizations makes it difficult to operate efficiently with each other 
( Davies & Love, 2011 ; Xue et al., 2016 ) and without this commonality, 
there is an increased likelihood of one party behaving opportunistically. 
Past research has considered various governance issues, the role of 
trust, commitment, organizational culture and cultural fit concerning 
how it may support or incentivize collaborative behavior or at least 
limit opportunistic behavior. We consider whether these and/or other 
factors play an important role in the case of alliance-based contracts for 
megaprojects: 
Research Question: How do the mechanisms of trust, culture and gover- 
nance in alliance contracts encourage collaborative behavior and limit op- 
portunistic behavior in construction-related megaprojects? 
3. Methodology 
The relative paucity of megaprojects creates significant challenges 
in applying various research design choices. Even when it is possible 
to study more than one project being undertaken by a single organiza- 
tion, the projects are invariably unique, making direct comparison dif- 
ficult. Adopting a case study approach is therefore relatively common 
whereby the unit of analysis is either the organization(s) involved or 
the project itself. In this section we cover the methodological choices for 
this research into megaprojects; focusing upon the three interconnected, 
generic activities which define the qualitative research process used 
in this study – theory, method and analysis ( Denzin & Lincoln, 2012 , 
Henning, Hutter, & Bailey, 2020 ). 
In order to build a case study from research data, a qualitative ap- 
proach was used, as it allowed us insight into what had happened, why 
the respondent thought that this had happened and what the outcome 
was ( Miller, Dingwall, & Murphy, 2004 ). Qualitative research is flex- 
ible enough to deal with unanticipated factors which emerge and to 
provide information that would not have been considered as relevant 
( Miller et al., 2004 ). 
The research design connected the qualitative interpretive frame- 
work to strategies for inquiry and methods for collecting data ( Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2011 ; 2012 ; Morgan, 2007 ). Data was collected using ex- 
ploratory, qualitative interviews. 
Primary sources of data were fourteen extensive interviews with key 
stakeholders. Ten of these were undertaken face to face, but for differ- 
ent reasons, four were conducted via telephone. The job titles of those 
interviewed are shown in Table 1 . Research participants included staff
from the parent organization (head office and regional) and the alliance. 
Each interview lasted for approximately one hour (total of just over 16 
hours of interview material) and an interview schedule was used that 
was adapted as more data was collected and different issues emerged. 
Secondary data sources included websites, annual reports, strategic doc- 
umentation and procedures and were used as background information 
and as support for better understanding processes and relationships. We 
analyzed the organizational choices made by organizations involved in 
Table 1 
Job titles of research participants. 1 
1 Manager Road and Traffic Engineering 
2 Management Systems Manager 
3 Manager Finance and Commercial Services 
4 Manager Delivery Services 
5 Manager Materials Engineering 
6 Manager Organization and Employee Development 
7 Senior Manager Technology and Environment 
8 Manager Environment 
9 Senior Contract Coordinator 
10 Regional Manager 
11 Manager Project Delivery 
12 Project/Contract Manager 
13 Project Director 
14 Project Manager 
1 Some titles have been shortened so that individuals cannot be 
identified (e.g. the Executive Director of a function is a single person 
and thus, such people are listed here as managers of a function as this 
ensures that they cannot be identified and complies with the promise 
to participants to de-identify all participants and their contribution). 
Thus different managerial levels are all just listed as ‘manager’. 
the projects, the operational boundaries in terms of who did what, as 
well as the dynamics of relationships across alliance partners. As ques- 
tions related to various past activities of the organization, we accepted 
that information presented is recollected in the context or a particular 
time and place (and relative to subsequent events) rather a singular in- 
terpretation of ‘truth’ as per historical realism ( Rowlinson, Hassard, & 
Decker, 2014 , Burton & Galvin, 2019 ). The data used to develop this 
single case study was part of data collection for a larger study, which 
included two other large government infrastructure-oriented organiza- 
tions within Australia. 
Purposive sampling of participants was used to ensure the collection 
of appropriate rich data for developing the case studies. After the initial 
two interviews, we immediately started analyzing data and this helped 
determine what data to collect next ( Miller et al., 2004 ). 
Qualitative data from interviews was coded, using open coding 
( Creswell, 2002 ), then analysed and managed using NVivo. NVivo was 
chosen as the preferred analysis software because of its ability to assist in 
the maintenance of large data sets ( Parry, 1998 ), as well as contributing 
to the maintenance of precision and rigour in qualitative data analysis 
( Dasborough, 2006 ). In particular we coded for processes, which as- 
sisted in defining activities and issues and helped us make connections 
between structures and events ( Charmaz, 1990 ). A list of the high-level 
codes used is presented in Appendix 1 . Constant comparison and ques- 
tioning of data, categories and concepts were central to the efficacy of 
raising categories or terms to concepts ( Charmaz, 1990 ). The process of 
raising categories or terms to concepts was an active decision-making 
process shaped by the ideas the researchers has about the data, in rela- 
tion to the literature, once they have interacted with it ( Charmaz, 1990 ; 
Rapley, 2004 ). 
The use of a single, rich case study provides rich data ( Yin, 1994 ; 
Weick, 2007 ) enabling us to uncover insights into the operational 
choices concerning alliance contracting and the impact these choices 
had on the functioning of the alliance delivering the megaproject. While 
the methodological intention is to capture the richness of the single case 
study, Yin (1994) suggests that the description and analysis of a single 
case study has the ability to convey information about a more general 
phenomenon by calling attention to issues and by highlighting discrep- 
ancies between theory and practice. 
3.1. Data analysis strategy: a variant of the Context-Mechanism-Outcome 
configuration 
In order to unveil how and where opportunism or collaboration ob- 
tain in our case study, we build on the Context-Mechanism-Outcome 
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Table 2 
Context and mechanisms (from de Souza 2013 , p. 149). 
Context Mechanisms 
comprises aspects of related to the following emergent properties in an action context 
Structure mechanisms related to roles or positions 
mechanisms related to practices 
mechanisms related to resources 
mechanisms related to process 
Culture mechanisms related to ideas or propositional formulations about structure 
mechanisms related to ideas or propositional formulations about culture 
mechanisms related to ideas or propositional formulations about agency 
mechanisms related to ideas or propositional formulations about relations 
Agency mechanisms related to beliefs and reasons for action or non-action 
Relations mechanisms related to duties/responsibilities 
mechanisms related to rights 
mechanisms related to power 
configuration (CMOc) initially developed by Pawson and Tilley (1997) . 
The framework is based on the proposition: “causal outcomes follow 
from mechanisms acting in context ” ( Pawson & Tilley, 1997 : p.58). The 
authors advance the critical influence of context as the same mecha- 
nisms may generate different outcomes in different contexts: “The rela- 
tionship between causal mechanisms and their effects is not fixed, but 
contingent ” (p. 69). The context of action comprises the “material re- 
sources and social structures, including the conventions, rules and sys- 
tems of meaning in terms of which reasons are formulated. ” (Sayer, 
2010, p. 75). According to de Souza (2013 : p. 144): “The context of 
action refers to the context delineated for investigation by researchers ”. 
This paper is concerned with the mechanisms that give rise to collabo- 
ration or opportunism in megaprojects, and our context is the megapro- 
jects managed by Main Roads Western Australia. Background to the case 
organization is provided in the next section. 
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p. 50) define mechanisms as follows: 
“a mechanism is an irreducibly causal notion. It refers to the enti- 
ties of a causal process that produces the effect of interest ”. Pawson 
& Tilley (1997) conceive of mechanisms as interplays between struc- 
ture and agency able to generate outcomes in a particular context. For 
example, incentives are mechanisms that can be used to generate de- 
sired behaviors. De Souza (2013) argues that context may be decom- 
posed into four aspects: structure, culture, agency and the relational 
properties between them. Structure in this realm refers to the institu- 
tional roles, practices, resources and process that influence action. Cul- 
ture refers to the ideas and propositional formulations about: structure, 
culture, agency, or relations. Agency refers to beliefs and reasons for 
action. Relations refer to the potential for one party to influence the ac- 
tions of others through responsibilities, rights or power. She identifies 
12 generic mechanisms that relate to structure, culture, agency, and re- 
lations ( De Souza, 2013 , p.149). These are reproduced in Table 2 . 
The concept of mechanism and the aspects of context as defined by 
de Souza (2013) are well suited to our study as we are inquiring about 
the emergence of opportunism or collaboration (outcomes) through 
mechanisms (for example sharing of risks in an alliance contract) across 
three main contextual aspects: governance (as structure), culture, and 
trust (as relations). With regards to coding and analysis, after the ini- 
tially codes/categories/themes emerged from the analysed data, we 
used the da Souza model as an overlay – an extra codifying filter to 
further unpack the relationships between the codes/categories/themes, 
which are captured in the subsequent analysis, data and model. There- 
fore, the Context-Mechanism-Outcome configuration provides a frame- 
work to organize our analysis and findings. 
3.2. Case study setting 
Established in 1926, Main Roads Western Australia is Western Aus- 
tralia’s statutory road authority. Operations cover 2.5 million square 
kilometres, with dramatic diversity of climate and road conditions, mak- 
ing Main Roads one of the largest geographically spread road agencies in 
the world. Western Australia has 149,000 km of roads, of which declared 
Highways and Main Roads comprise 18,500 km ( Main Roads Western 
Australia, 2018 ). 
Up until 1980s Main Roads had total control over the design and 
construction of roads. In 1996, on the basis of the State Govern- 
ment’s economic rationalist reform agenda there was a rapid shift- 
ing towards outsourcing work to the private sector resulting in se- 
vere staff reductions ( Edmonds, 2007 ). A 2001 report found this out- 
sourcing model had severely impacted Main Roads knowledge base 
( Edmonds, 2007 ). In 2002, there was a move towards relationship con- 
tracting and particularly alliancing. A new Commissioner was appointed 
who brought with him a wealth of contracting experience and knowl- 
edge from another government agency, including relationship contract- 
ing ( Edmonds, 2007 ). The first public-private alliance occurred in 2003 
to build Stage 7 of the Roe Highway ( Edmonds, 2007 ). This initial al- 
liance contract was still fairly prescriptive, but was a significant step 
in an evolutionary process toward relinquishing control to an alliance 
entity. Four years later, they moved to a situation whereby the alliance, 
once established, would operate as autonomous decision-making bod- 
ies. In essence, resources and knowledge from multiple organizations 
are combined to create a new organizational entity or ‘child’ which is 
distinct from the parents ( Inkpen & Currall, 2004 ). Since then, Main 
Roads has used alliance contracts for its larger projects (only those 
above $25 million). This includes megaprojects such as ‘Gateway WA’ 
(Perth Airport and freight access project) which was initially budgeted 
at $1.2 billion (but was built for approximately $50 million under this 
estimate) and the Tonkin Highway Stage 3 extension ($1.16 billion). 
Other projects that do not meet the $1 billion threshold, but may be 
considered to be a megaproject and were undertaken using alliance con- 
tracts includes the Dampier Highway duplication which involved pass- 
ing through an area rich in Aboriginal heritage and requiring innovative 
solutions to cut through rock formations up to 14 m high without dis- 
turbing heritage sites. 
4. Case-study – Main Roads Western Australia 
As per the initial coding categories listed in Appendix 1 , we found 
respondents highlighted the role of critical thinking, culture, leadership, 
organizational structure, organizational systems or processes and trust. 
There was a high level of overlap between critical thinking and culture. 
Aspects of the interviews that were coded as relating to critical think- 
ing centred around challenging assumptions, reflection by participants, 
valuing diverse opinions, whilst culture highlighted the organizations’ 
values, norms and power. Given the overlap in many of the ideas and 
the intermingling of points, we ended up collapsing all of these issues 
under the heading of Culture. 
In respect of leadership, respondents tended to focus on the deci- 
sions made such as the planning process, the move to decentralize cer- 
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Table 3 
Governance mechanisms and collaboration outcomes. 
Mechanisms Outcome Quotes 
Technical Advisory Group collaboration “They are not part of the alliance, but understand the needs of the alliance and provide advice (they are also not 
working on behalf of Main Roads WA) ”
New MRWA commissioner collaboration “Well the guy [COMMISSIONER] that we have is almost a guru on relationship contracting and … he was brought in …
because of that expertise, because we had problems in the past with the contractors, … his approach with relationship 
contracting has worked very well in the Water Corp … from day one he has basically been working through with our 
executive, our managers on this, so we probably have the strongest advocate of relationship contracting …”
Alliance contract collaboration “In the contract environment, contractors are motivated by making money – they focus on claims and variations. In an 
alliance the focus is on getting the job done. ”
Lessons learned collaboration “Importantly we are documenting everything we do and feeding that back into […]. … There will be a further lesson 
learnt process at the end of the detailed design phase. All of these are documented and fed back into […]. There is a very 
fluid interface between the alliance … [partners] – but not intrusive ”. 
Alliance facilitator collaboration “Craig referred to them as “quasi-psychologist ” – they have facilitated the team building workshops which are a key part 
of identifying individual goals and then formulating common goals. ”
Innovation register collaboration “It is interesting that, because within the alliances we are running at the moment, there is a register kept, called the 
innovation register and anyone can come up with a smart idea and they get recorded and its got all of these steps about 
analysed, put into practice, recognised and we have never done that on our own works in such a formal manner, but it 
is another thing that alliancing is bringing along as part of the team building sort of effort. ”
Integrated alliance office collaboration “The best part of the alliance is their proximity to the constructor and environmentalists, they are in the same office …
so they can bounce ideas of each other and the constructor is actually part of the design team as it unfolds. ”
tain decisions etc, rather than how they set the values and culture of 
the project, i.e. the points focussed on how leaders made their choices 
and the structures through which leadership was enacted. As such, there 
was significant overlap with the issues concerning organizational struc- 
tures and organizational processes for making decisions. We grouped 
these together as core governance considerations given governance ad- 
dresses all of the processes used in the act of governing the organiza- 
tions. Finally, the concept of trust was addressed frequently and did not 
obviously overlap with any other coding categories. Subsequently, we 
refined our coding to highlight how decisions and practices with re- 
gards to governance, culture, and trust to identify mechanisms as per 
Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) CMOc and De Souza’s (2013) generic mech- 
anisms. Outcomes are categorized in relation to their contribution to- 
wards establishing collaboration, opportunism, or mixed outcomes. We 
discuss each theme in turn. 
4.1. Governance mechanisms and outcomes 
MRWA’s first alliance contract would not constitute a megaproject 
(Stage 7 of Roe Highway) and the contract was very prescriptive with 
MRWA looking to assume control and whilst not perhaps operate op- 
portunistically, they did not align to the cooperative behaviors desired 
by the executive level managers in that information was hoarded rather 
than shared. To overcome this problem a number of mechanisms were 
put in place to foster collaboration ( Table 3 ). The Technical Advisory 
Group (TAG) was set up as an external party to provide technical ad- 
vice to the alliances. Since, the TAG has since become a formal part of 
the governance structures used by MRWA. In relation to governance, 
the TAG was credited in fostering collaboration between MRWA and its 
alliance partners -though TAG’s impact in relation to trust -discussed 
later- was more mixed. 
The appointment of the new MRWA Commissioner was specifically 
motivated by a strategic change to move to relationship contracting. The 
espoused view from leadership was that collaboration would deliver bet- 
ter outcomes compared to prior adversarial practices. The shift in man- 
agerial attitude, driven by the new commissioner, was the impetus for 
moving away from being a traditional construction organization to im- 
plementing new practices. The governance structures in place for resolv- 
ing issues and even solving problems were extensive, and working in the 
integrated alliance office together made collaboration far easier. A key 
governance choice was to introduce an independent alliance facilitator 
to work with the alliance management team to determine goals, along 
with core systems and processes. Part of this process involved estab- 
lishing explicit non-cost key performance indicators, which were mea- 
sured and rewarded by the client as part of the contract. These included 
training, indigenous employment, occupational health and safety, stake- 
holder relationships and environmental issues. The use of a facilitator 
was designed specifically to avoid behavior that was of self- rather than 
mutual interest. This contrasted with the traditional, adversarial, ap- 
proach of design and construct contracts which fostered opportunistic 
behaviors. In terms of location, staff from MRWA that were allocated to 
the alliance contract were physically relocated to the operational head- 
quarters of the alliance. Working on site together made collaboration 
far easier and contrasts directly to the more aggressively managed de- 
sign and construct contracts where the parties were spatially separated, 
leading to less collaboration. 
There were very mixed views on the systems that underpinned some 
alliance processes and lessons learned (see Table 4 ). In some parts of the 
alliance, they seemed to work very well. However, others did not see the 
processes in action and felt that learning was often compromised. The 
governance structures in place for resolving issues and solving problems 
were extensive, however, the processes in place for learning were not 
universally well developed or at least appropriately implemented. With- 
out this, the potential to build trust was limited and some respondents 
felt that this process really only paid lip-service to the notion of collab- 
oration between the partners. 
One mechanism that elicited negative feedback was the secondment 
of staff to the alliances, which were perceived to penalise the headquar- 
ters’ teams performance, leading some managers to push back. 
4.2. Culture mechanisms and outcomes 
Alliance partners agreed that the biggest challenge in establishing an 
alliance partnership was bringing people from different organizations 
together to think as one as a starting point for collaboration. Cultural fit 
was recognized as an issue by interviewees. As MRWA had a traditional 
public sector culture that developed standards for the industry, was sub- 
ject to various forms of review from Freedom of Information requests to 
reviews by the Auditor General, and needed to be conscious of the needs 
of a variety of stakeholders, it is not unsurprising that the culture was 
often viewed as somewhat bureaucratic. In comparison, alliance partner 
organizations were ‘for-profit’ firms that was far more commercially fo- 
cused. “No one way is right or wrong, but different organizations have a 
different culture, behaviours, work ethics and time management ”. It was in- 
evitable that people from different organizations would bring with them 
ideas concerning how things should be done that reflected their previ- 
ous organizational culture. “MRWA and McMahon had a similar culture, 
while the design and geotechnical companies had similar cultures ”. 
The development of a culture of collaboration was fostered by the 
investment in a number of mechanisms: the consultants brought in as 
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Table 4 
Governance mechanisms and mixed or opportunism outcomes. 
Mechanisms Outcomes Quotes 
Lessons learned mixed “What we don’t get necessarily is a critique of what worked well and this was a design flaw or this didn’t work and we 
had to do something completely different ”. 
Alliance processes mixed “There is a lot more flexibility to fix problems and change things quickly. To do this they use “think tank ” sessions and 
tap into the TAG team – the benefit is a much quicker turnaround on problems and finding ways to save money while 
delivering a quality product. 
However, keeping everyone informed does have a downside – too many meetings and potentially making the 
management team too big. Getting this right is a balancing act as you have to be careful not to put the alliance partners 
off side. However, it is harder to get decisions with a bigger group. Having said this, the discussion is open and there are 
no hidden agendas. While the workshops are important for team building they do take up a lot of time and there is the 
risk of too many meetings. ”
Secondment of staff to alliance opportunism “… the alliance contracts are resource hungry … three of my people were part of the [alliance] team. Now that project 
realistically should have involved designers for no more than nine months … well two of those guys were away for two 
years and the third guy was away for three years … I tried to get my guys back … it killed me because of not being 
able to use them. ”
Table 5 
Culture mechanisms and outcomes. 
Mechanisms Outcomes Quotes 
Alliance facilitator collaboration “Although there is a contract in place, things are very different from a conventional contracting situation in that we 
negotiate better outcomes and there is a different mindset ”
Team building collaboration “Team development [of the management group] happened during the design phase ... Because of the different cultures it 
has been a battle from day one to build a team and we have had to constantly work on our team culture and 
development. We have … focused on creating a new team with a unique identity ”
Alliance contract collaboration “ … without a doubt I would do another alliance because of the benefits over conventional contracting. You stand to get 
better rewards and you have a much better relationship with the client. Contracting is tough and alliancing is a more 
pleasurable way of doing work and the client gets a better quality product. Also, there is the flexibility to challenge 
standards, which are often very conservative and may not be consistent across all environments. ”
Secondment of staff to alliance mixed “The workforce is a very transient group which makes team development at operational level very difficult – about four 
or five people leave every week and about four or five new people start ”. 
Conservatism of MRWA culture opportunism “Historically to set the scene, we really have still remnants of a pretty military type organisation and there’s good reason 
for that because at the time when Main Roads was being constructed there was actually a lot of ex-military people got 
involved and up until recently you could still pick the military people in the organisation, because that is the way they 
carried on. ”
Conservatism of MRWA culture opportunism “There is still a lot of scepticism from my colleagues back at […] as to whether [my involvement in the alliance] is 
worth it. ”
Table 6 
Trust mechanisms and outcomes. 
Mechanisms Outcomes Quotes 
Alliance contract collaboration “[The alliance contract provides a …] sort of freedom because the risk-reward structure is … set up slightly different, so 
you know with an alliance contract it is kind of like a variable price, so the minimum … they are going to walk away 
still making a profit, their standard profit, but if they do it really well they will get, you know, quite a good profit and 
we will share in that as well ”
Integrated alliance office collaboration “I have no doubt that alliancing is better than contracting. I think from a personal point of view that there is a much 
greater sharing of knowledge. My knowledge base has really grown and I have a better understanding of the other 
parties, like design, approvals and geotechnical, inputs and drivers. While I have a better understanding of the design 
process, the designers also have a better understanding of the impact of their decisions. For example, they now 
understand the cost to move machinery if there is a design change. ”
Alliance processes collaboration “From a [construction perspective], I am not interested in the detail, but the designers are focused on detail. Now I 
understand the review processes they go through and why it is so time consuming. So, we all have a better 
understanding of the other parties’ processes ”
Technical Advisory Group mixed “There were conflicts over flexibility with members of the TAG “wanting to protect their domain ”. 
Lessons learned mixed “The lessons learnt sessions on the current alliance happen in an open forum – these haven’t always been good because 
they tend to degenerate into a [complaints rather than learning] session ”
Integrated alliance office opportunism One participant commented that: “ … people might be careful about what they say because they are sitting next to 
someone from a different organisation ”. 
alliance facilitators, the co-location of staff in the integrated alliance 
office, and the incentives built into the alliance contract were the most 
prominent (see Table 5 ). “Once the contract was awarded, we focused on 
team development, including establishing common values ”
4.3. Trust mechanisms and outcomes 
The most powerful mechanism for the establishment of trust was the 
alliance contract, as it relies on collaborative behavior as the basis for 
sharing the risks and rewards in respect of a specific project ( Table 6 ). 
Compared to Design and Construct (D&C) contracts, there was clearly 
a much greater level of trust between participating organizations: “The 
biggest advantage of an alliance is that it does away with the focus on dollar 
value as in contracts. This negates the clashes over contract that happen in 
D&C contracts. In an alliance the focus is on how do we fix it ”. The clear 
focus on trusting the alliance partners to act collaboratively sits in direct 
contrast to the self-interest that was overt in the (smaller) design and 
construct contracts. As observed earlier, the co-location of alliance per- 
sonnel in an integrated office contributed to establishing trust through 
better mutual understanding (see Table 6 ). However, some mechanisms 
appeared to have unintended negative consequences: the lack of cultural 
alignment sometimes prompted people withdraw -at least in part- from 
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Table 7 
Contexts, mechanisms and outcomes synthetic view. 
Mechanisms 
Context 
Governance Culture Trust 
Technical Advisory Group C M 
New MRWA commissioner C 
Alliance contract C C C 
Lessons learned C / M M 
Alliance facilitator C C 
Innovation register C 
Integrated alliance office C C / O 
Alliance Processes M C 
Secondment of staff to alliance O M 
Team building C 
Conservatism of MRWA culture O 
Outcomes : C = Collaboration; M = Mixed; O = Opportunism 
collaboration due to negative perceptions of process (lessons learned) 
or context (integrated alliance office) – see Table 6 . 
The Technical Advisory Group’s approach was sometimes perceived 
negatively as protecting their interests or that of MRWA. There was a 
level of tension within MRWA because of the multiple roles it had to 
play as client, team member and adviser (TAG). These different roles 
supported differing levels of collaboration and whilst the TAG was de- 
signed to support the alliance as a totality some respondents did not see 
it this way (see Table 6 ). One suggestion to overcome this conflict was 
that the TAG be made up of the best in industry (or at least a variety of 
people across the alliance partners) not just MRWA personnel. 
4.4. Interplay between governance, culture and trust through mechanisms 
Our analysis identified 11 mechanisms observed to play out across 
the three contexts (Governance, Culture, Trust), generating 21 outcomes 
(Collaboration, Opportunism, Mixed) – see Table 7 . Only three mecha- 
nisms observed (New MRWA Commissioner, Innovation Register, Team 
Building) performed in only one context as their impact was narrowly 
targeted. All other eight mechanisms observed generated outcomes in 
multiple contexts. 
The core mechanisms of the alliance contract and alliance facilitator 
were both noted to have a positive impact on collaboration in estab- 
lishing appropriate incentives, values and behaviors. Their impact was 
reinforced across the three contexts: the contract was putting the right 
incentives in place (governance) so that alliance personnel from MRWA 
and contractors were expected to do the right thing (trust), whilst the 
consultants helped facilitate the processes of establishing the right ways 
of working (governance), and appropriate values (culture). 
Other mechanisms had diverse outcomes, depending on context: the 
co-location of personnel in the alliance office was perceived to foster 
collaboration and understanding, but could also generate some mistrust 
if the staff involved were not on board with the new alliance culture, 
and the same could be said to the lessons learned process. Similarly, 
The new alliance work processes were also seen to foster collaboration 
as they generated mutual understanding, but could also at times appear 
overly bureaucratic and reducing the incentive to collaborate. Finally, 
the TAG was perceived as supporting collaboration on technical issues, 
but its sometimes ambiguous role could at times be mistrusted by al- 
liance partners. 
The secondment of staff to the alliance office was seen by both 
MRWA and the alliance as a mixed blessing: MRWA managers were at 
times reluctant to second their staff to the alliance, as this was perceived 
to be detrimental to the core business, whilst the short assignment of 
technical personnel was sometimes perceived as a burden on establish- 
ing a culture of collaboration in the alliance as these staff were rotating 
frequently. This probably suggests an opportunity for improvement in 
making these secondments better understood by headquarters, and the 
induction into the culture of the alliance more effective. As noted above, 
at the time of the study, there was still a measure of ignorance about 
the work and culture of the alliance at MRWA. 
In the following discussion we build on these observations at the 
level of mechanisms to consider the interrplay between governance, cul- 
ture and trust. 
5. Discussion 
In considering the research question of “How do the mechanisms of 
trust, culture and governance in alliance contracts encourage collaborative 
behavior and limit opportunistic behavior in construction-related megapro- 
jects? ”, the case reveals that different mechanisms pertaining to gover- 
nance, culture, and trust may help drive collaborative or opportunis- 
tic behavior, or behavior that could be classified as mixed in that both 
behaviors were observed at times. Taken in isolation, each of these is 
necessary, but not sufficient to explain the establishment of collabora- 
tion, or opportunism. More significantly, the case study shows that they 
influence each other, in negative and positive ways. In this section we 
briefly briefly discuss our findings concerning governance, culture and 
trust, before we turn to their interactions. 
In terms of governance, the case study shows that the alliance con- 
tract is best supported by some form of Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) 
( Lahdenperä, 2012 ; Mesa Molenaar, & Alarcon, 2016 ) where the project 
team is co-located, and the alliance becomes a distinct organization, al- 
beit a temporary one, from the partnering parents as this allows trust- 
ing relationships to form that support collaborative behavior. The suc- 
cess of the IPD relies on establishing a ‘best for project’ governance 
( Aapaoja et al., 2013 ) where the primary driver is problem solving, 
rather than cost (from the perspective of the sponsor) or profit (from the 
perspective of the contractors). If these latter objectives (cost/profit) are 
prioritized then opportunistic behavior becomes more likely – as made 
clear by respondents in discussing design and construct contracts. 
The study also highlights the instrumental role of the third party 
consultants used to advise the alliance on process (alliance facilitator) 
and technical issues (Technical Advisory Group): these independent ad- 
visors played a critical role in bringing in very different organizations 
as they enabled the alliance to establish its own rules and procedures 
independent from the parents. At the same time, the case study reveals 
ongoing tensions between alliance governance and parent governance: 
in some instances (e.g. lessons learned) the need to preserve face and or 
alignment with the parent invited opportunistic rather than collabora- 
tive behaviors. This indicates that the establishment of distinct alliance 
governance structures are not sufficient to warrant collaboration, and 
that the management of parent influences on the alliance required on- 
going effort and investment on the part of the alliance managers. The 
alliance governance enabled a greater degree of transparency between 
partners compared to traditional contracts, and this was perceived to be 
a key enabler of trust. 
Concerning trust, the case study confirms the expected pattern of 
trust development ( Ring & Van de Ven, 1994 ) where initially trust is 
calculative and rests on the contract and negotiated terms: the early ne- 
gotiation of non-financial KPIs by the alliance partners illustrates this 
early phase. Over time, the alliance participants gained greater knowl- 
edge of each other’s ways of working and started operating as a team, 
based on cognition-based trust. Trust in the processes to resolve issues, 
determine costs and reward parties in the case of successful projects 
helps build collaborative behaviors. 
However, we did not find significant evidence of affect-based trust 
beyond the core project management team: this may be explained by the 
high degree of staff rotation in the alliance. The temporary nature of the 
project organization, and the transient participation of team members 
was perceived to weaken the trust between partners, and therefore on 
occasion was a trigger for opportunistic, rather than collaborative be- 
haviors. Furthermore, there was evidence that managers outside of the 
alliance would often pressure the alliance for the return of key staff as 
they felt that their other projects were being disadvantaged by the ex- 
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Fig.1. Collaboration and opportunism in megaprojects as outcomes of interactions between culture, governance and trust through mechanisms 
tended tenure of their staff in the alliance – a clear case of opportunistic 
behavior, though in this case, the entire alliance is disadvantaged rela- 
tive to the operations of one of the parties. However, we also observed 
that this weakness in establishing affect-based trust between alliance 
members was able to be somewhat compensated for by the presence of 
similar cultures between organizations, or better yet, building a unique 
alliance culture that pervaded all members of the alliance. 
Moving now to issues pertaining to culture, establishing clear val- 
ues and behavioural norms supportive of alliance success to foster col- 
laboration was perceived essential by alliance team members. This is a 
dimension where the alliance facilitator role was influential, in particu- 
lar during the early phase of the alliance process. The case study shows 
that deliberate efforts were invested for this purpose. The temporary 
nature of the project organization ( Turner & Müller, 2003 ; Lundin & 
Söderholm, 1995 ; Bakker et al., 2016 ) and the transient participation of 
some project team members, however, were perceived by participants 
as undermining the cultural efforts and thus limiting potential for highly 
collaborative approaches to delivering the different parts of the project. 
Distinct from permanent organizations ( Johnson, 1988 ; 
Schein, 1985 ), where values and norms become embedded over 
time and become taken-for-granted, the alliance as a temporary organi- 
zation does not have the same luxury of time: values and norms require 
to be established quickly, and this means that a deliberate investment 
is required without spending inordinate amounts of time building and 
re-building the culture as people joined or left the alliance: “Getting 
this [organization development activities] right is a balancing act as you 
have to be careful not to put the alliance partners off side ”. The case 
study shows in this respect a direct relationship between culture and 
governance: the joint decision-making meetings, where all alliance 
members were represented and information was transparently shared, 
were seen to be instrumental to the establishment of a shared alliance 
culture ( Scott, 2019 ; Galvin Tywoniak, & Sutherland, 2008 ). 
5.1. The interplay of governance, trust, and culture 
One of the reasons why alliance contracts may be more successful 
relative to traditional contracting approaches in respect of megaprojects 
is their capacity to provide a degree of flexibility in terms of how the 
alliance partners may deal with ‘unknown unknowns’ ( Winch & May- 
torena, 2011 ). There is no attempt to lock-down all aspects of what 
is almost certainly going to be a complex contract over a long time- 
frame. While the relational focus of alliance contracts has the potential 
to eliminate the adversarial attitude that often pervades traditional con- 
tracts, by itself, there is no guarantee that it will eliminate opportunistic 
behaviour ( Laan Voordijk, & Dewulf, 2011 ). Alliance contracting may 
incentivize collaborative behavior via the sharing of risks and rewards 
between partners ( Arthur & Kennedy, 2014 ), however, such collabora- 
tive behavior needs to be supported by considerations such as parties 
trusting that promises of sharing the risks and the rewards will actually 
be enacted, having governance processes that create confidence in the 
resolution of issues throughout the contract and a culture that values 
collaboration over self-interest. 
The role of governance structures, trust and culture have been ad- 
dressed in respect of alliance contracts either explicitly or implicitly in 
a number of studies ( Biesenthal & Wilden, 2014 ; Brunet & Aubry, 2016 ; 
Clegg et al., 2002 ; Gil, 2009 ; Lau & Rowlinson, 2009 ; Xue et al., 2016 ). 
We found that these dimensions may re-inforce one another, and also 
that their salience for project leaders may vary over time. Clear gov- 
ernance structures that cover issues such as dispute resolution, decision 
making processes and performance measuring systems helps to build cal- 
culative trust. Similarly, greater commonality in culture or the creation 
of the ‘third culture’ that is different to the ‘home’ cultures of any of the 
parties may assist people to build affect-based trust based on emotional 
ties and feelings of similarity between parties. Cultural fit allows parties 
to work together more effectively, thereby reducing the level of reliance 
upon formal governance structures. In essence, these three dimensions 
may become self-reinforcing thereby significantly reducing the potential 
for opportunistic behavior. The key to this virtuous cycle of mutual re- 
inforcement between governance, trust, and culture is revealed through 
the impact of the mechanisms used by managers: for example, our anal- 
ysis noted how external consultants (e.g. alliance consultants and TAG 
in our case) can reinforce the impact of governance decisions (contract, 
integrated project team). This is summarised in Fig. 1 below. 
What was also clear from the research was that managers could ‘dial- 
up’ one mechanism if necessary to try and enhance collaborative behav- 
ior and limit the potential for opportunistic behavior. For example, at 
the start of every contract a consultant was used to build an initial level 
of trust. This was required as the governance structures had not been 
bedded down and integrated into the new structure. This initial attempt 
to build trust did not always work or some initial friction between par- 
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ties around specific issues led managers to ‘pull another lever’. This was 
most commonly governance structures with formal meetings and formal 
reports to managers or committees. This was not always welcome (e.g. 
“too many meetings and potentially making the management team too big ”), 
however, the formal structures were able to compensate for a lack of 
trust and the lack of a common culture for a period of time. Of course, 
these formal governance structures slowed progress and if used for too 
long may start to create a negative (highly bureaucratic) culture and a 
lack of trust (due to feelings that nobody can be trusted to work with 
each other outside of formal structures), but it can buy the management 
team time to try and create a common (collaborative culture). Over- 
all, this points to managers needing to think holistically and selectively 
about how to combine investments in governance, culture, or trust, in 
order to obtain the desired collaborative behaviours. 
In our study, we did not observe megaprojects that devolved into a 
state where only the formal governance structures held the partners to- 
gether in a somewhat collaborative manner. However, in the same way 
that these three enablers may be self-reinforcing in a positive sense, they 
may theoretically reinforce each other in a negative manner. For exam- 
ple, an erosion in trust may see participants revert to their original firm 
culture and attempts to enforce order via increasingly bureaucratic gov- 
ernance structures which reduce efficiency and push the partners away 
from collaborative behaviors. Overall, these three enablers are critical 
considerations in respect of the extent to which collaborative behaviors 
dominate and parties do not engage in opportunistic behaviors when 
undertaking alliance contracts to deliver megaprojects. 
6. Conclusion 
The complexity, cost and one-off nature of megaprojects make it dif- 
ficult to present generalizable conclusions concerning their delivery be- 
yond high-level principles ( Davies et al., 2017 ). The single case study 
approach used in this study to research the conditions that encour- 
age collaboration and limit self-interest suffers from these same limi- 
tations. Nevertheless, the shift towards non-traditional contracts to de- 
liver megaprojects from alliance contracts to public-private partnerships 
( Bygballe et al., 2010 ; Lahdenperä, 2012 ) has led to a focus on the inter- 
nal functioning of these contracts and the role that trust, commitment, 
interdependence, values, cultural fit and other dimensions might play is 
assisting the effective functioning of these contracts and limiting oppor- 
tunistic behavior ( Davies et al., 2017 ). In line with this research theme, 
we find that establishing the right governance, trust and culture were 
critical. On its own, each of these is necessary but not sufficient to sup- 
port collaboration becoming the default behavior within the alliance. 
The case study shows that these three enablers of collaboration interact 
strongly one with another through mechanisms, e.g. the transparency of 
the governance was perceived as supporting the development of trusting 
relationships, the active development of shared rituals in the joint meet- 
ings was instrumental in embedding cultural values and norms, and hav- 
ing a strong culture also assisted in establishing cognition-based trust. 
Previous studies had identified the contribution of these three enablers 
to the successful establishment of collaborative behaviors in alliances 
(e.g. Kadefors, 2004 ; Pinto et al., 2009 ; Clegg et al., 2002 ; Hietajärvi & 
Aaltonen, 2018 , Xue et al., 2016 ) and our study confirms some of the 
findings from the extant literature. However, our work extends these 
contributions by considering more than one or two conditions or incen- 
tives that restrict opportunistic behavior and encourages collaborative 
behavior – which has dominated research in this area to date – as well 
as looking at how these factors interact with each other, both positively 
and negatively. 
While alliance contracts see risks and rewards shared between par- 
ties and are built upon relational norms, the potential for opportunistic 
behavior still exists ( Sanderson et al., 2018 ). At a practical level, our 
study suggests that firms that wish to reduce the potential for oppor- 
tunistic behavior would do well to consider the role governance, trust, 
and culture as enablers of collaborative behaviors in project alliances 
and IPDs, and the associated mechanisms. However, the investments in 
such mechanisms is not free (as evidenced by the investments made by 
MRWA) and in less costly and complex projects may not outweigh the 
cost of possible opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, for the megapro- 
jects we considered, we highlight how these enablers interact: gover- 
nance, trust and culture need to be strongly aligned for collaboration 
to establish, as any weakness in one of those mechanisms is potentially 
inviting the return of opportunistic behaviors. The case study shows that 
a significant investment is required to establish collaboration, but also 
that over time, this can be a challenge due to the temporary nature of 
the alliance organization and the transient participation of some team 
members: the alliances experienced challenges in sustaining the team 
and agreement on the goals and objectives initially negotiated. There- 
fore, the performance of an IPD is very much alike a high performance 
team ( Aapoja et al., 2013 ; Katzenbach & Smith, 2015 ), however with 
a couple of subtle twists: the project alliance is more fragile than tra- 
ditional high performance teams as it operates under the constraints of 
multiple parent organizations with sometimes divergent interests, and 
the composition of the alliance team is subject to relatively frequent 
changes. The implication for the success of complex projects is that a 
holistic and integrated approach is required to establish and maintain 
collaboration between alliance members, and that this requires contin- 
ual efforts throughout the phases of the project. Looking forward, the 
role of the IPD is clearly critical and rather than use the megaproject or 
the contracting organization as the unit of analysis, it would be benefi- 
cial to study the membership of the IDP and their individual traits (from 
personality traits to their own personal objectives) and how alignment 
or misalignment amongst this group impacts the functioning of the al- 
liance contract. 
We acknowledge the limitations associated with a single case 
methodology, and call for additional evidence, both from qualitative 
and quantitative studies to confirm and reinforce the results presented 
here. Also, in order to fully cover what is a multi-faceted and complex 
phenomenon, we would welcome studies framing the research using 
theoretical lenses that complement the economic perspective taken in 
this paper to address more fully sociological and/or managerial consid- 
erations ( Winch, 2014 ). 
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